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After the failure of the Abolition Bill in 1791, selected testimony to Parliament on the topic of 
abolition was published and offered for sale to interested readers. The statistical and anecdotal 
information contained in An Abstract of the Evidence Delivered….on the Part of the Petitioners 
for the Abolition of the Slave Trade overwhelmingly concerns the administration of life and 
death within the regime of plantation slavery, as detailed by white Britons who traveled to the 
West Indies and the American colonies in various public and private capacities. Among those 
called to testify is Ninian Jeffreys, a Master in the Royal Navy, who describes witnessing the 
execution of seven enslaved persons in Tobago in 1774, who stand accused of “murder[ing] a 
white man, and destroy[ing] some property on the estate.”1 Jeffreys offers no details about the 
circumstances surrounding the purported crimes or about his involvement, if any, in the trial and 
the sentencing. He is “present…at the execution”: he reports that he stands near a man named 
Chubb as Chubb’s arm is cut off—he does not say by whom. At this point in Jeffreys’s narration, 
he recalls what Chubb says as he walks to his death. Jeffreys is “standing within two or three 
yards” when Chubb turns to him and says, “‘Buckra, you see me now, but to-morrow I shall be 
like that,’ kicking up the dust with his foot.”2  
Chubb’s remark, which is impossible to authenticate, is clearly shaped by its transmission 
and by the fact it is reported posthumously by a non-intervening witness. Nevertheless, its force 
is unmistakable. It frames his execution as a disappearance, a vanishing act, implying that his 
witness will soon have nothing left to see except dust: it acknowledges colonial law’s reliance on 
visible spectacles of violence (“you see me now”) but also forestalls or rather collapses the 
extended duration of such violence, referring only to his future as dust (“to-morrow I shall be 
like that”).3 The very thing that figures lifelessness—dusty silence—also figures power, 
connecting the episode to actual as well as fictional instances of the enslaved committing suicide: 
dust cannot be injured and cannot be owned. But the articulation of this point voices a paradox: 
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the enactment of this logic of lifelessness as power, or the removal of life as power, also removes 
the capacity to speak as a living body and to perform the sort of self-reference of “you see me 
now.” Chubb’s remark might be read to suggest that Chubb will be unharmed by anything 
anyone does once he is dead, or it might be read as presenting death in terms of deliberate 
muteness. But if from one angle it indicates Chubb’s control of what his death can be taken to 
mean, from another, it indicates the impossibility thereof. Chubb’s reported speech indexes a 
separation between rhetorical existence and biological life that is central to representations of 
enslavement. It opens onto questions of speaking and dying, of self-representation without self-
reference, and of the uncanny convergence between being heard and being dead that are central 
to antislavery in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. Such questions bear on records 
like the above, which are comparatively rare, as well as on imaginative depictions and responses 
to such events, which are the focus of the analysis below. 
This essay considers the relation between the end of biological life and the beginning of 
rhetorical existence in selected antislavery poetry published in Britain in the last three decades of 
the eighteenth century. It focuses in particular on the conjunction of speaking and dying, 
examining how the rhetorical figures that facilitate such utterances perform, while they also 
arrest, the person-making and humanizing processes that have been seen as so central to 
antislavery poetry.4 In doing so, it offers an alternate genealogy of antislavery poetry’s first-
person speakers and suggests that some of these texts evince more skepticism about the very 
categories on which they appear to depend than they have typically been seen to. The argument 
that follows places important work about the social and political significance of death in the 
colonial world in contact with discussions of figure and genre, including the “corpse poem,” 
which “give[s] voice to the voiceless cadaver.”5 It considers how figures of death, speech, and the 
speaking dead underwrite the representation of the enslaved as poetic speakers in both well- and 
lesser-known antislavery poetry, and it examines how these texts make a claim on the future 
precisely through constructing rhetorical structures that outlive death or take death as their origin 
or occasion. Its intervention is to suggest, first, that first-person renderings of death are both 
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formally and thematically more central to the poetry of antislavery than they have previously 
been seen to be, and, second, that the conjunction of speaking and dying offers a way of thinking 
about rhetorical representations that are not recuperative or attached to ideas of the human or the 
politico-legal person.6  
The depiction and meaning of death remained a contested crux of pro- and anti-slavery 
debates in the approximately two decades between the Somerset decision and the defeat of the 
motion for abolition. Such debates concerned the comparative prevalence of death among the 
enslaved, the extent to which planters were responsible for these deaths, and the moral as well as 
economic significance of Britain’s involvement in the enslavement of human persons not legally 
recognized as such. Death was used as evidence, as a tool of argument, and as a symbol: 
struggles over its meaning are evident in Parliamentary proceedings and in many antislavery 
sermons, periodicals, pamphlets and poems that circulated throughout the Atlantic world, as well 
as in colonial law and in reports of slave suicide.7 These narratives aimed not only to 
communicate information about death but also to shape public responses to it. Because many of 
these discussions occurred far from colonial and naval sites of death, they offered a distant and 
de facto selective account, even as they drew on witnesses’ statements and other forms of 
evidence.8  
The question of how to transmit information about enslavement and death to members of 
the public in Britain and North America was hardly a simple one, and one of the central 
challenges the Abolition Committee and other antislavery campaigners faced was how to make 
realities that were distant, present and proximate. Antislavery poetry offered a highly mediated 
representation of enslavement and various arguments against it, and yet also attempted to present 
itself as unmediated, or immediate, a vehicle for feeling that would be certain to make its case.9 
To do so, it often depicted enslaved persons as first-person speakers, whose utterance was meant 
to authorize the poems’ claims and to evoke experiences at once individual and collective. A 
subset of these poems imagined the remarks of dying or dead speakers. These first-person 
voices—living, dying, dead—are instances of prosopopoeia, the figure that represents the speech 
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of “an imaginary, absent, or dead person.”10 Prosopopoeia is a voice-giving but not necessarily a 
life-giving or legal-person-making figure, and it differs from personification in that it does not 
attribute human shape or form where it did not previously exist.11 Though many readings of these 
poems discuss them in terms of personification, the two figures are distinct. The question that 
applies here, and that underlies many existing accounts of antislavery poetry, is how figure 
operates and what it is seen to secure.12 What are the consequences, in other words, of generating 
a voice that speaks for someone else and yet uses the first person to do so, especially when it 
makes reference to injury suffered by an imaginary, absent, or dead body?13 Furthermore, given 
that the figure in question, prosopopoeia, is powerfully associated with legal oratory as well as 
poetic and dramatic technique during the period, what connection, if any, exists between poetic 
and legal uses of the figure? Scholarship on antislavery poetry and sentiment has suggested that 
figure operates to animate and confer humanity, raising as well as attempting to redress the 
problem of the perceived inhumanity of the enslaved, albeit in limited and often paradoxical 
fashion. It is the argument of this essay, however, that poetic figure can also hold voice apart 
from body and life, and from the legal category of personhood, in ways that resist these 
reparative moves and that associate speech with unmaking rather than making, death rather than 
life. 
In its classical as well as eighteenth-century uses, prosopopoeia is not a purely literary 
figure: it is associated with law as well as drama and poetry.14 It refers to a rhetorical technique in 
which the speaker takes on the voice of another: this can happen in a legal case, when an 
advocate speaks as the client, or in a play or a poem.15 Prosopopoeia derives from the Greek word 
prosopon, meaning face or mask, and describes the process by which the prosopon is made to 
speak. The prosopon can be human or nonhuman, real or imagined, animate or inanimate: 
prosopopoeia can give voice to imagined persons, cities, and the dead, as well as to living 
humans. In one of the period’s frequently cited examples, taken from Quintilian, Cicero speaks 
as the city to berate Catiline. In doing so, Cicero not only produces a voice for the city, but also 
makes the city a rhetorical person. Eighteenth-century rhetorics commonly describe 
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prosopopoeia as “the fiction of a person.”16 Here, the term “fiction” is not limited to imaginative 
literature, but refers to the representation of a speaker other than oneself, particularly when 
linked to emotional intensity or persuasion. Ephraim Chambers notes that poets make “frequent 
use” of the figure “in their fictions,” and orators use it “in their painting of violent passions, 
which seem to transport, and make them forget themselves.”17 A public speaking manual from 
1797, intended for the use of barristers in particular, advises that speakers obviously change their 
tone when employing the figure: “[Y]ou ought, in this figure, to change your voice, so that it 
may immediately appear as if it were not you speaking for yourself, but for another person 
introduced in the course of your speech.”18  
In thinking about how prosopopoeia represents rhetorical persons, it matters, of course, 
who or what is being spoken for: prosopopoeia encompasses speech on behalf of entities (like 
cities), the dead, humans seen as incapable of representing themselves (children, the enslaved, 
the mentally unsound), as well as humans seen as capable of representing themselves. The figure 
can accompany literal muteness or structural or statutory muteness or no muteness at all. Clearly, 
it differs according to the specifics of its use: speaking for the living as opposed to the dead or 
the inanimate involves different configurations of authority and interest and different potential 
consequences. Nevertheless, all forms of prosopopoeia involve a certain doubling, inasmuch as 
they generate a claim that refers to but is not authored by the person or position to which it 
refers. In many of its legal applications, prosopopoeia entails a claim concerning responsibility 
towards the prosopon or wrong done to it. In such instances, the “fiction of a person” can but 
does not necessarily coincide with a living human being; likewise, it can but does not necessarily 
coincide with a legal person. The “fiction of a person” makes the being or entity in question 
recognizable and can grant it social or political existence that it otherwise lacks. In the example 
from Cicero, the city “after a manner silently speaks” to express the way in which it has been 
wronged: “Your former actions, though they ought not to have been borne, yet I did bear as well 
as I could; but now that I should be wholly occupied with fear of you alone…this is no longer 
endurable.”19 The prosopopoeia of the city expresses its injury and gives voice to its interests, 
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using the first person to make it appear that it is speaking for itself. But if prosopopoeia has the 
power to make claims about injury or harm heard, it nevertheless depends on borrowed 
authority: the orator’s authority flows through the prosopon, which becomes audible through this 
process. The city cannot speak without Cicero voicing it, and yet the figure strives to naturalize 
the city’s speech as an expression of what the city would say if it could. Prosopopoeia invokes as 
well as disrupts the self-reference that is typically understood to characterize first-person speech. 
In cases where prosopopoeia makes claims about injury or harm to a sensate body, this 
slipperiness around self-reference becomes particularly fraught, because prosopopoeia’s claims 
float free of actual injury even while appearing to link together speech and body in a relation of 
self-reference that presents the speaker as having experienced the injury or harm under 
discussion.  
The most familiar and oft-cited prosopon in antislavery poetry from the period is the 
titular “[n]egro” from William Cowper’s “The Negro’s Complaint,” whose first-person voice is 
meant to demonstrate the injustice of his treatment.20 As is well known, the poem offers rhetorical 
elevation in place of other forms of recognition. A reading of prosopopoeia that proceeds from 
Cowper will look different, I want to suggest, than a reading of the figure that proceeds from 
examples in which the speaker is dying or dead, for in these cases there is less liability for the 
rhetorical person to blend into the legal person, the living being, or the human. Fifteen years 
before Cowper’s poem “traveled almost over the whole island” in 1788, Thomas Day and John 
Bicknell’s The Dying Negro offered a different paradigm of prosopopoeia, one which also claims 
wrong done to the prosopon, but which projects an earth-bound future that the speaker will be 
absent from, in the process reminding the reader that the figure’s life-giving potential is a 
fiction.21 Along with the other poems discussed below, The Dying Negro offers a new way of 
thinking about the use of figure in antislavery poetry, one not exhausted by the dynamics of 
sentiment and its extension of humanity, but instead defined by a deliberate suspension of such 
processes. The Dying Negro inaugurates what we might call a new kind of mortuary poetics 
within British antislavery. By this I mean a poetics that not only concerns death but that 
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understands it as the organizing principle, both formally and thematically, of its figuration of 
speech. This representation of the speaking and the dead, or the speaking as the dead, is 
developed further in poems of the 1790s, discussed below, and it leads me to my discussion of 
the “corpse poem” as a way of theorizing this strand of antislavery. 
The Dying Negro, first published in 1773 and revised and expanded in a second and third 
edition (1774, 1775), is an influential and much-imitated poem that comprises the last words of 
its titular speaker. It has clear affinities not only with the heroic exceptionality of Behn’s and 
Southerne’s Oroonoko but also with the representative singularity of later antislavery poems 
spoken by “the” “negro” or “African” or “slave.” The poem’s full title—A Poetical Epistle, 
Supposed to be Written by a Black (Who lately shot himself on board a vessel in the river 
Thames;) to his intended Wife—sketches the surrounding circumstances, taken from newspaper 
reports on which the poem is loosely based.22 The speaker’s intended wife is a white servant he 
has been prevented from marrying, despite having been recently baptized; the poem’s setting is a 
ship in the Thames the speaker has been forced aboard, in defiance of the Somerset ruling of the 
previous year.23 Though the first edition of the poem presents itself as a document “supposed to 
be written,” it clearly draws on oratorical technique: the dying speaker addresses his beloved, his 
master, the gods of Africa, and the Christian God, in registers ranging from the sentimental to the 
polemical to the vengeful.24 The ongoing nature of the speaker’s dying can be read along at least 
three different lines: first, it amplifies the poem’s emotional appeal to readers, second, it allows 
the speaker to express his wishes about how he will be memorialized, and third, it represents 
states of living and dying as overlapping and mutually implicated, which is essential to the 
poem’s depiction of death’s meaning.  
The techniques used to represent death in The Dying Negro employ as well as resist 
prevalent poetic modes of making death mean, including the sentimental and the elegiac. As the 
poem develops its response to the speaker’s impending death, it initially introduces familiar 
coordinates of departure and mourning (the beloved “bedew[ing]” the grave, the enumeration of 
all that the speaker will miss), but then goes on to qualify them, turning away from what it 
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dismisses as the quietism of traditional modes of memorialization.25 Perhaps the strongest 
example of this appears when the poem apostrophizes the natural world that the deceased will no 
longer witness: “Ye waving groves… / Ye meads now glitt’ring with the morning dew! / Ye 
flowers… / …shall fade no more.”26 The poem appears to become elegiac here, but it introduces 
elegy only to disavow it: the flowers bloom on “yonder hated shore,” and they fade at the 
speaker’s “baneful step.”27 Instead of the natural world conspiring to mourn the departed, the 
flowers shrink from the speaker, and he refuses their future use as memorials to him: “I ask no 
vernal bloom— / No pageant wreaths to wither on my tomb. / —Let serpents hiss and night-
shade blacken there, / To mark the friendless victim of despair.”28 The reference to “my tomb,” 
which forcefully claims it as the speaker’s, is a revision of the first edition’s “No pageant 
wreaths to deck an outcast’s tomb,” and intensifies the claim to ownership internal to the poem.29 
The hissing serpents and the nightshade “mark[ing]” the speaker’s grave reject elegiac or 
epitaphic consolation and instead threaten visitors with death, expressing a desire to be able to 
posthumously hurt others.  
The event of the speaker’s death, which happens beyond the bounds of the poem, is to 
some extent “suspend[ed]” by the speaker’s position as dying.30 This allows the speaker to be 
strongly associated with the dead, even though he has yet to die, which in turn prompts scrutiny 
of what it means to be dying, whether quickly or slowly, voluntarily or not. In place of the 
familiar elegiac and epitaphic reminder of how death comes to everyone, the poem offers a 
different take on the idea that in the midst of life we are in death. It does so by associating 
enslaved life with a state of dying, which is to say waiting to die or, in the speaker’s case, 
electing self-murder. In part, this is a comment on slavery and social death, but it is also a 
challenge to divisions between the living and the dead as they are drawn elsewhere. The poem 
develops its polemical edge as it modulates the meaning and significance of death within the 
framework of determinism and self-determination. It uses death to describe the condition of 
slavery (the speaker becomes a “carcase” when sold) and suicide as the last weapon to use 
against it (the speaker is “Arm’d…with the power to die”).31 In presenting the grave in which the 
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body rots as preferable to the grave of the slave ship (the “hecatomb,” as Day calls it in the 
preface), the poem uses self-murder to raise the specter of slavery as mass murder: 
And better in th’ untimely grave to rot, 
The world and all its cruelties forgot, 
Than dragg’d once more beyond the Western main, 
To groan beneath some dastard planter’s chain, 
Where my poor countrymen in bondage wait, 
The long enfranchisement of ling’ring fate.  
… 
A slow-consuming death let others wait,  
I snatch destruction from unwilling fate.32 
 
Suicide defies the planter’s will (or in this case, the Captain’s) because it refuses coerced labor 
by turning the living body into a corpse. It puts an end to forced survival and the violent 
extraction of capacity, and delivers the “enfranchisement” of death, “for not beyond the grave, / 
Thy power extends, nor is my dust thy slave.”33 The master who “[f]orbade me Nature’s common 
rights to claim” cannot deprive the speaker of rights once he is dust, but neither can dust 
experience deprivation, or indeed claim rights in the same way a living person can.34 Nor, for that 
matter, can dust speak, without the help of fictions and figures. The speaker’s self-extinction 
exempts him from being “dragg’d once more” into enslavement, but it does so by exempting him 
from having any sort of experience in the future. It is importantly distinct from the deaths of 
white Britons imagined in the poem (for instance, those of the ship’s crew, and those caused 
when “Eternal justice wakes” and “Afric triumphs” in a widespread revolt) because its 
untimeliness “snatch[es]” death from “unwilling fate,” transforming a life of slow death—of 
awaiting “ling’ring fate”—into the immediate “enfranchisement” of choosing to become a 
corpse.35  
In The Dying Negro, prosopopoeia is not concerned with giving life, but instead with 
giving voice to death. Along with the other antislavery poems I discuss below, it moves towards 
an association of the poetic speaker with a corpse. Here, Diana Fuss’s query about “[w]hy, and 
when…a dead voice [is] more appropriate than a live one” is particularly relevant.36 To consider 
dead and dying speakers as essential to antislavery’s ventriloquism invites a new account of 
figure in antislavery poetry, one which does not associate figure with life-giving or humanizing 
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powers, but instead with the suspension or the stepping to the side of such processes. My 
argument about this alternative genealogy of figure in antislavery poetry complements, but does 
not overwrite, existing arguments about figure in antislavery poetry, which overwhelmingly 
approach it via the sentimental. Such accounts ask what is at issue when a poem claims to 
demonstrate humanity and seems to assume that a rhetorical figure can ontically elevate—and 
needs to ontically elevate—an enslaved person. Mary Loffelholz states the worry clearly:  
 
In terms particularly of the rhetoric of abolitionist sentimental poetry, the problem is the 
writing over of animate persons in order to make the inanimate object that the poem only 
then rhetorically endows with life and personhood. Sentimental writing, in Philip Fisher’s 
influential formulation, “experiments with the extension of full and complete humanity to 
classes of figures from whom it has been socially withheld,” thus generating “novel 
objects of feeling” for sentimental readers.37  
 
The problem with the sentimental, in other words, is that it first must make into an object the 
very entity it wants to turn into a subject. When the entity in question is a human, rather than a 
snuffbox or a starling, this means removing the very quality (humanity) that is to be restored. 
Loffelholz continues, “To the extent that it depends on personification for its agents, and on 
prolepsis and metalepsis for its actions, sentimental poetry perhaps even more than sentimental 
fiction thus foregrounds the problem of the figure’s role in extending the effects of ‘complete 
humanity’ to the objects it proffers to benevolent readers.”38 The catch with using figure to extend 
complete humanity is, of course, that humanity is then just a figure, or the effect of a figure. As 
Lynn Festa remarks, “the provisional lending of human traits and voice to the slave creates the 
effect of humanization without any necessary real transformation.”39 Seen in this way, figure in 
antislavery poetry is a conservative device, one that has the potential to maintain the privations it 
claims to address. And this reading of figure certainly applies to many antislavery poems which 
celebrate the piety of their readers while instrumentalizing the enslaved, offering up set pieces of 
suffering that can be consumed and set to the side, having performed the function of making the 
reader feel, but not too much.40 
In the late 1780s and early 1790s, the continued influence of Day and Bicknell’s work is 
evident in poems with similar titles that retain the strategy of representing the enslaved speaking 
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from near or even beyond the grave. These include Frank Sayers’s “The Dying African” (c. 
1789-90), another anonymous poem of the same title published in The Gentleman’s Magazine, 
signed S. S. (1791), John Collins’s “The Desponding Negro” (c. 1792), and an anonymous, 
untitled poem, which begins “On his downy pillow lying,” also published in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine (1792).41 I will discuss Sayers’s and Collins’s poems—both of which were also 
performed as ballads—before turning to the two anonymous ones. Both Sayers’s “The Dying 
African” and Collins’s “The Desponding Negro” describe the plight of an African sold into 
slavery who yearns to die or is about to die. Sayers’s poem catalogues the speaker’s physical 
suffering and his infirmities, ending each stanza with the refrain, “For the strong arm of death is 
the arm of a friend.”42 Whereas it stages the speaker’s death—“Slow, slow beats my heart, and I 
hasten to rest”—“The Desponding Negro” narrates the speaker’s escape from death, which he 
bitterly rues.43 Each poem employs metrical emphasis to heighten its description of forced 
survival and regulated temporality, associating such regularity with physical as well as 
psychological suffering and with the desire to be released from it. This has the effect of placing 
the speaker’s voice in the context of determining constraints rather than making it appear wholly 
self-determined. 
In “The Dying African,” verse structures and gives expression to a tension between the 
physiological rhythms that keep the body alive, on the one hand, and the imposition of physical 
conditions and demands that are inimical to survival, on the other. We might think of these as 
two different sorts of involuntary rhythms, which the meter displays as continuing and regular: 
the slowing, yet still steady heartbeat (“Slow, slow beats my heart”), and the repeated brutalities 
the speaker will no longer experience once he has died: “No more shall I sink in the deep-
scorching air, / No more shall sharp hunger my weak body tear, / No more on my limbs shall 
keen lashes descend / For the strong arm of death is the arm of a friend.”44 In the anaphoric “no 
more” and more strongly in the later “Now, now shall I ’scape—every torture will end,” the 
poem expresses pulses of will in the wish to die.45 But these expressions of will do not in any way 
diminish the strong association of repetition and metrical regularity with subjection in the poem, 
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whether to overwork and arbitrary punishment or to continued survival. “The Dying African” 
does not simply communicate suicidal despair, but instead suggests that the continuance of life in 
a condition of enslavement is undesirable precisely because life becomes and enables the 
subjection that the poem metrically evokes. It also seems possible that the poem might not raise 
consciousness so much as subdue it, precisely because of its repetition, regularity, and refrain. 
Max Cavitch describes the metrics of the poetry of slavery “as a history of subjectivation through 
rhythm,” and asks whether such verse has “a structuring attachment to subjection”: to what 
extent do metrical conventions expose the regulated time of labor and to what extent do they 
reproduce it?46 In the case of “The Dying African,” it is not simply metrical regularity but also the 
presentation of death as a friend and the disappearance of any responsible parties or agents (the 
lash descends without any mention of a hand, or indeed a willing agent, directing it) that makes 
the poem liable to smooth over the very claims that it might seem so urgently to raise.  
Antislavery verse also uses meter to present enforced survival as a form of unfreedom 
that etiolates life; here, being fated to live is more unlucky than being fated to die. The emphatic 
verse of “The Desponding Negro” communicates the physical and psychological urgency of the 
speaker’s desire to escape captivity (associated not only with enslavement but also with free 
existence in Britain), while also giving form to economic determinants of the speaker’s survival, 
both as a captive on board a slave ship and a blind beggar, “wandr’ring for Bread now.”47 The 
speaker’s struggle to collect money provides the poem’s refrain: “Spare a Halfpenny—spare a 
Halfpenny— / Spare a Halfpenny to a poor Negro.”48 But this statement of scarcity exists 
alongside two parallel trajectories of prodigious accumulation: first, that of the speaker’s series 
of injuries, and second, the enrichment of the captain who acts only according to the 
“Prospect…[o]f Gain.”49 These two trajectories are placed almost immediately at odds when the 
speaker reaches the deck during a storm, only to be struck by lightning: “I all wildly despairing / 
Burst my Chains, rush’d on Deck, with mine Eye-balls wide glaring, / When the Lightning’s 
dread Blast struck the Inlets of Day, / And its glorious bright Beams shut for ever away.”50 As the 
speaker narrates being struck blind by lightning, his injury—his loss of sight—is immediately 
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subordinated to the captain’s financial loss, which spurs his decision to murder the speaker: “The 
Despoiler of Man, then, his Prospect thus losing, / Of Gain by my Sale, not a blind Bargain 
choosing, / As my Value, compar’d with my Keeping, was light, / Had me dash’d overboard, in 
the Dead of the Night.”51 The speaker lives to tell the tale of this attempted murder because he is 
rescued by a ship bound for Britain. However, he describes his rescue as a further loss, a robbery 
made possible by the very moonlight he cannot see: “But by Moonlight descry’d, I was snatched 
from the wave, / And reluctantly robb’d of a watery grave.”52 The representation of rescue as theft 
highlights how the experience of forced survival (and attempted murder) will only be resolved in 
the hereafter, “when the Judge and the Ponderer, / Shall restore Light and Rest to the Blind and 
the Wanderer.”53 
These two poems’ repetitive and cumulative form extends to their repetition in 
performance. Because they must be repeated, they must offer up the biography they contain more 
or less endlessly. To repeat the poem is to replay indefinitely the sequence of dying, or of 
attempted murder and rescue, but more than that, to make the speaker a technology of repetition. 
This overlays the act of speaking or singing with a tale that circles back on itself, again and 
again. Though the 1790s substantially predate recording technology, the poem’s multiplication in 
performance as well as its dissemination in print endlessly reanimates the climactic events of its 
narrative. The suggestion that the speaker is forced to repeat the song again and again raises 
questions about the machinic aspects of antislavery poetry’s ventriloquism. Is the reproductive 
technology here not the speaker but instead the poetic genre itself? If poetic fictions such as this 
one make a claim to authenticity based on injury, and ask the reader or listener to stand toward 
the poem as if it is real, as if it derives from an original that is true, then the repetition of such 
poetic fictions both depends on the idea of an original and endlessly multiplies it. This is 
precisely the logic expressed by titles that name the dying, desponding, complaining “Negro” or 
“African.” Though clearly there is a sense in which the repetition of the poem can be seen as an 
amplification of its claims, a broadcasting ever more loudly of the harm it describes, there is the 
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further question of who can justly represent the dying and the dead—corpses unrecorded in the 
annals of history—and how such justness is determined.  
The presence of dying or rescued speakers in antislavery poetry would appear to place 
death in the future, so that dying is never fully complete and is endlessly reiterable. But in fact 
death is a relation to the present as well as to the future in these poems. The corpse and the grave 
describe states of life and states of death in The Dying Negro and “The Desponding Negro”; to 
be a corpse while alive is at once proleptic (it is what you will become) and descriptive (it 
captures an ongoing present of non-autonomy and violent use). The association between speaker 
and corpse in these poems is used to anticipate death and to associate chattel slavery with death, 
but because the poems do not describe the moment of the speaker’s death, the corpse might best 
be understood as a limit state that the poem approaches but never reaches. But in at least two 
cases, antislavery poetry does depict the moment of death. This occurs in “The Dying African” 
(1791), signed S. S., and in the anonymous, untitled poem (1792) mentioned above. “The Dying 
African” follows the conceit of Day and Bicknell in representing the speaker’s dying words, and 
of Sayers in attempting somatic realism with a slowing pulse and dimming eyes. It includes 
many familiar features of antislavery poetry: the speaker’s separation from his family, his 
suicidal wish to have leapt to his death at sea, his present experience of torture and coerced labor, 
the continuation of which is expressed through anaphora. Like Day and Bicknell’s poem, it 
expresses a dying wish to be heard, imagining a ghostly groan as the continuation of the 
speaker’s demands. The sequence unfolds as follows, addressing Britons who consume goods 
produced by slave labor:  
Mid hours of frolick hear this feeble moan 
Let my shrunk ghost arise, and startle at my groan.  
Oh, if among the guardians of your laws,  
Some nobler son of feeling pleads our cause, 
Our constant blessings shall his steps attend 
First in our prayers shall rise the sufferer’s friend.54 
 
This passage juxtaposes the groaning ghost, who communicates without speaking, the dying 
speaker, whose demand to be heard continues posthumously, and the antislavery advocate 
(doubtless a white Briton), who pleads “our cause.” All three voice a condemnation of slavery, 
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but only the “nobler son of feeling” does so as the author of prosopopoeia rather than the 
prosopon, the face or mask made to speak. As suggested above, the use of dying speakers in 
antislavery poetry helps to expose the use of figure to produce speech, and this passage does so 
explicitly in its implied alignment of the poet and reader with “nobler son[s] of feeling.” In light 
of this, it is notable that the poem’s concluding lines attempt to re-naturalize prosopopoeia as a 
kind of living utterance only, by representing the end of the speaker’s remarks, followed by his 
death, which another voice narrates. The quotation marks that frame the speaker’s address close, 
and: “—He spoke no more! / His quiv’ring lips had lost their wonted pow’r! / His eyes were 
fix’d! he feebly mov’d his head / His pulse no longer beat! His spirit fled!”55 Even in a poem that 
describes ghostly groans, there is a hesitancy to depict the ghost as speaking, which maintains 
the need for auditors of the groans to translate them into persuasive speech. And yet these 
closing lines can also be read as commenting on the fact that the poem is no longer making the 
speaker’s lips move or pulse beat.  
It appears, then, that death defies first-person narration in antislavery poetry. However, in 
at least one case, an antislavery poem presents a dead speaker who describes his death—which 
has already occurred—from a first-person perspective. This occurs in an anonymous, untitled 
lyric, published in the Gentleman’s Magazine in March 1792. This poem is among the most 
exceptional antislavery verse published in Britain in the eighteenth century, and to date has gone 
unremarked, with one important exception.56 Like The Dying Negro, it claims to be based on a 
death the author has learned of, but it contains no heroic romance, and hardly a trace of 
sentiment. The poem opens by describing a planter asleep, who is visited by visions of all the 
enslaved persons he has harmed, including the speaker: “On a sudden, all around him, / Troops 
of sable ghosts appear’d; / While his conscious fears confound him, / These upbraiding sounds 
he heard.”57 The poem’s opening sequence, set in a dream, frightens the planter and wakes him.58 
These seemingly inarticulate “sounds” become intelligible speech in the following stanzas, as the 
planter is forced to listen to a series of indictments. The first several are familiar and include the 
incompatibility of slavery and Christianity and the hypocrisy of the British commitment to 
Accepted version – 16 
	
liberty. The address moves fluidly between the first person singular and plural for the first three 
stanzas, suggesting that the plight of the speaker is shared by many others: “Then, from each 
relation parted, / Heat, and cold, and toil we bore; / Oft my back with scourging smarted, / And 
my limbs were stain’d with gore.”59 The speaker’s description of his injuries immediately 
precedes his narration of his suicide. Notice how the “I” erupts at the moment of self-
annihilation: 
 
Thus tormented, wild, despairing, 
Every hour my bosom wrung, 
T’escape worse torture, blindly daring, 
O’er the cauldron’s verge I sprung. 
In the boiling sugar sinking,  
Cruel man! thou dids’t me see; 
But the cup thy slaves are drinking 
After death awaits for thee.60 
 
The speaker’s retelling of his own death might make it appear ongoing and incomplete, along the 
lines of the participial states of dying and desponding mentioned above. But this is not in fact the 
case: even though the speaker’s narration of his death replays it, and the past action of “sprung” 
comes into contact with the present in its retelling, it is clear that the speaker is dead from the 
beginning. The poem’s entire expression is posthumous: its fiction of a person attaches a voice to 
a dead body, not a living one. What is remarkable is how the poem stages the production of the 
speaker’s voice by connecting it directly to the moment of his death. As the speaker narrates his 
own death, he describes his passage from living body to corpse. “The corpse,” remarks Jonathan 
Lamb, “is the antithesis of property” because “it has no person to exchange.”61 The corpse, in 
other words, has no body that can be valued for its labor, no person in the sense of the person as 
bearer of rights and duties.  
In making a corpse speak, this poem interrupts the bundling together of living body, 
voice, and rhetorical personhood that characterizes other antislavery poems with enslaved 
speakers. Whereas the speakers of The Dying Negro, “The Dying African,” and “The 
Desponding Negro” are imaginable as still living, even though they are dying, the speaker of this 
untitled poem is not. The fact that the speaker is already dead is the clear pretense of the poem as 
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well as the topic of its narration. And yet to be dead, here, as I have said, is the condition for 
speech. It is also, crucially, the condition for sidestepping traditional circuits of sentimental 
identification and conventional elegiac forms. Several points follow from this. First, this untitled 
poem exposes figure as the source of rhetorical existence much more clearly than the others: 
prosopopoeia’s fiction of a person is much more obviously fictional if it emanates from a dead 
body than from a speaker who sounds like a living person speaking for himself. Second, within 
the poem, death is the condition for speech: not only does the poem separate rhetorical existence 
from biological existence, but it in fact suggests that they are incompatible in this particular case. 
Or, to put the point slightly differently, the poem uses one impossibility—the speaking dead—to 
illuminate another—the speaking slave. By speaking, I mean speaking for oneself and 
recognized as such.  
Part of the reason that this untitled poem is so important, in addition to the fact that it 
unflinchingly depicts self-murder by commodity that ruins the commodity, is that it clearly holds 
rhetorical self-representation (which is posthumous) apart from legal or political self-
representation. This matters because it arrests any slippage between lyric and politico-legal 
person.62 The speaking corpse may be a rhetorical person but it is not a politico-legal person and 
does not desire to become one: it is beyond the realm of the politico-legal person. There is no 
danger that one might experience the poem as attempting to shift from one register of the person 
to the other. This is in sharp contrast to antislavery poetry with living speakers, where figure’s 
operation can recede sufficiently to be invisible and can create a powerful but false naturalizing 
effect of making it seem that the speaker is what Hobbes would call a natural person, that is, 
someone who is able to speak for himself and be held responsible for himself.63 Because the most 
forceful moments in these poems can come across as autopoiesis, and because these poems 
include claims about rights (to safety, security, property), they traverse these different realms of 
the person within their fiction. But, as discussed above, they cannot effect the transformations 
they describe: their use of prosopopoeia in particular and figure in general has widely been 
understood as conservative, precisely because it conserves the very distinctions and exclusions it 
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claims to redress. My point here, in relation to this poem and the tradition of which it is a part, is 
that figure can also be used radically. I do not mean that figure can literally liberate anyone, but 
that it can call attention to the impasses and contradictions within discourses of freedom and 
liberal personhood, it can shatter sentiment, and it can call for revolt. And radical uses of figure 
can, by virtue of their exceptional nature, make visible conservative ones. 
The poem’s dead speaker puts mortality to political ends, using his posthumous authority 
to call for revolt, which is both individual—“I vengeance shall obtain”—and collective—
“Negroes want not strength and bravery / When for freedom they’ve a mind.”64 The continuance 
of the speaker’s voice, in defiance of the convention that the dead do not speak, makes this poem 
what Diana Fuss terms a “corpse poem,” a poem not simply about the dead but spoken by the 
dead, “a first-person poetic utterance, written in the present or past tense and spoken in the voice 
of the deceased.”65 Fuss’s analysis of the genre focuses on the past two centuries and does not 
discuss antislavery poetry, but her theory of the corpse poem offers a powerful heuristic for this 
untitled poem and the tradition of antislavery poetry that it develops and extends.66 Such poems 
“bring language more fully in line with death…[and] seek to revivify and reauthorize the dead”: 
as such, they sit uneasily alongside the dominant forms of elegy and epitaph that are more 
interested in speaking about the dead than as the dead.67 The corpse poem resists the epitaph as 
monument as well as the idea that memorials to the dead should speak not in the voice of the 
dead but in “the general language of humanity as connected with the subject of death,” as 
Wordsworth describes it in the first of his Essays on Epitaphs (1810).68  
The corpse poem does not invite mourning; unlike the elegy, it does not offer consolation 
to those who survive, and unlike the epitaph, it does not associate the stone’s silence with the 
deceased’s.69 The corpse poem is in some sense indifferent to grief, or at least more insistently 
separate from it than the epitaph and the elegy.70 It places a fiction of voice alongside a fiction of 
death. It therefore offers a very different mode in which antislavery poetry can explore slavery’s 
relation to life and death, one that is not elegiac or epitaphic or generally sentimental, but one in 
which all appearances of being a subject are fictions. Here we begin to see an answer to the 
Accepted version – 19 
	
question of what “the fictional persona of a cadaver allows poets to achieve.”71 In this poem, a 
dead speaker is appropriate, even necessary, not only because the dead speaker is irrecoverable 
via sentiment or other reparative modes, but also because the dead voice speaks about what the 
living lack. The dead voice articulates the living’s muteness as well as the desire for this to no 
longer be the case; it acquires political existence not in relation to itself but in relation to others, 
who might carry out the “vengeance” the speaker prescribes.  
The corpse is no longer a sensate body but remembers its existence as one; when it 
speaks in print, it records a death that would otherwise have been unknown to many and perhaps 
even unrecorded. In this regard, “figures of speech [in the corpse poem] come to stand in for the 
missing or forgotten corpses of history.”72 The prefatory note to the poem emphasizes this: it 
remarks that the poem is based on a real episode in which a slave who has refused to work and 
has been whipped says that if he is punished again, he will die. As soon as the overseer 
undertakes to harm him further, he kills himself by jumping into the boiling sugar. The 
grotesque, ironically posed question that concludes the prefatory note, “Had this slave no 
feeling?,” implies not only a dullness of physical sensation but also a lack of sympathy toward 
the “humane good man” who had ordered his punishment.73 It is not simply that having no feeling 
refers to sympathy denatured by violence, as in Cowper’s “Sweet Meat Has Sour Sauce,” but 
that it describes being beyond the reach of physical sensation and therefore beyond the reach of 
physical harm, which is the poem’s condition of possibility. The corpse poem abstracts the 
speaker from sensation and from life in a way that is not privative. Whereas elegy’s anaphoric 
reminders of what the dead will no longer experience present the removal from life and from 
sensation as the grounds for mourning, voice here outlives the sensate body to express what the 
sensate body experienced and what it, by virtue of its racialized particularity, was categorically 
excluded from: the protections of law to guard against such violence and use. 
The central significance of the speaking dead to antislavery in the last three decades of 
the eighteenth century, which is a development that can be traced from The Dying Negro through 
the untitled poem discussed above, indicates an intensification in tone and a turn away from 
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sentiment in the representation of enslavement to the reading public. But it also demonstrates a 
tendency to employ figure in part to expose figure and to invite readers to reflect on it. As 
antislavery poetry moves away from the affirmative tones of Cowper to the despairing and at 
times menacing strains of “The Desponding Negro,” “The Dying African,” and other poems in 
the same vein, it develops a mode of representation that is not easily assimilable to the living or 
the human. The use of figure, specifically prosopopoeia, in these poems to show the nonidentity 
of living and speaking associates figure not with the restoration of the human, but with the 
suspension of the human, or the falling beyond the human. This has the advantage of allowing 
for a discussion of these poems that is not governed by humanity and inhumanity, or by certain 
sentimental forms.  
In closing, I want to reflect briefly on the relation between rhetorical and politico-legal 
persons. I have deliberately used the term “rhetorical person” to describe prosopopoeia, but it 
will be clear that other configurations of the person are pressing in here, not least those that 
concern legal responsibility and rights, and that are denied to enslaved persons under chattel 
slavery. Both rhetorical personhood and politico-legal personhood encompass representation of 
oneself (or of another’s self), and contemporary definitions of each use speech as the medium of 
such representation. Such an idea of representation making persons calls to mind Hobbes’s 
influential formulation of the person. “A person,” Hobbes writes in Leviathan (1651), “is he 
whose words or actions are considered, either as his own or as representing the words or 
actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by 
fiction.”74 The person, in effect, is a category of representation, of speaking for oneself or for 
someone or something else: most anyone or anything that can be represented can be a person. 
Crucially, however, not all persons are able to speak for themselves: not all persons are 
considered what Hobbes calls authors of their own words and actions. Those who cannot speak 
for themselves, either because they are not in possession of a voice (like cities or the state) or 
because their voice is not officially recognized (like children or the enslaved), are only able to 
become persons when spoken for. Such beings and entities are what Hobbes calls artificial, as 
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opposed to natural, persons. As is well known, not all humans are natural persons, and the mere 
ability to speak does not necessarily entail natural personhood. The essential point is that what 
Hobbes calls personation (the word he uses for making persons) is akin to prosopopoeia. His 
discussion in Chapter XVI of Leviathan refers to the prosopon to describe how any personation, 
whether of oneself or another, is “act[ing] or represent[ing].”75 Hobbes’s person looks 
surprisingly similar to the fictions of persons described above, where fiction does not refer to 
unreality so much as to rhetorical figure and the process of figuration.76 For Hobbes, persons are 
called into being through figuration, but the distinction between being able to figure oneself, on 
the one hand, and needing to be figured by another, on the other hand, is hardly self-evident. It 
depends on categories of social, political, and legal recognition seen to be pre-existing and yet 
generated—or at the very least reinforced—by the process of figuration. Figuration, in other 
words, effects the very separations it is said to reflect. 
Hobbes’s account of personhood is concerned not only with representation, but also with 
rights and responsibility, which is to say with owning one’s own or others’ actions. It is invested 
in being able to show that its representation is just, and therefore can rightly make claims about 
what any given person owns (i.e., is responsible for) and is owed. In light of this, the dead 
present an interesting case: though prosopopoeia can represent them as speaking, and therefore 
as rhetorical persons, they cannot be persons in Hobbes’s sense. The dead are beyond the bounds 
of the person for Hobbes because they no longer own anything and are no longer owed anything. 
It seems notable, then, that the poems under discussion here present the dead as speaking by 
using a rhetorical figure tied to instantiating the person in Hobbes’s philosophy. If prosopopoeia 
can make persons in Hobbes’s sense, it can also represent their unmaking. In representing their 
unmaking, it can articulate how biological life and speech are held apart not only in poems that 
ventriloquize the dead, but also in the giving and withholding of personhood more generally. We 
might see this as opening up a fissure in the category of the person, or as suggesting the need to 
move beyond the term in discussing antislavery without recurring to reparative and restorative 
patterns. In either case, these poems refuse figure as resolution, in favor of figure as interruption. 
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